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and commercial disputes between those common law provinces that have implemented a 
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connecting factors for taking jurisdiction, and issues related to immovable property.
*  Professor, Faculty of Law, Western University. I am grateful to Vaughan Black, Sagi Peari, 
Janet Walker, and the three anonymous reviewers for their comments on a draft of this 
article.
I. APPROACHES TO JURISDICTION ....................................................................................................... 64
II. PRESENCE VERSUS ORDINARY RESIDENCE .................................................................................... 69
III. THE PRESUMPTIVE CONNECTING FACTORS ..................................................................................... 72
A. The Requirement .................................................................................................................. 72
B. The Factors ........................................................................................................................... 73
IV. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY ...................................................................................................................... 76
V. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................................... 77
Special Issue
The CJPTA: A Decade of Progress
(2018) 55 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL64
THE AIM OF THIS SHORT ARTICLE is to consider the central differences in the law 
on taking jurisdiction in civil and commercial disputes between those common 
law provinces that have implemented a statute on jurisdiction and those common 
law provinces that continue to rely on the common law.1 Jurisdiction is a broad 
topic and therefore this consideration must be somewhat selective, aiming to find 
the points of greatest divergence.2 And before those differences can be identified 
and assessed, a general overview of the two approaches is required as context. That 
overview requires some history as to how the common law approach has evolved.3
I. APPROACHES TO JURISDICTION
In the early common law, there were two bases for jurisdiction in personam over 
a defendant: presence and submission.4 However, in nineteenth-century England 
the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 5 authorized courts to assume jurisdiction 
over defendants who resided outside the forum under provisions allowing for 
service of the originating process ex juris. A similar development occurred in 
Canada as each province adopted rules governing service ex juris. While the 
various Canadian regimes were not uniform, under the typical approach the 
provisions set out enumerated situations in which the plaintiff was allowed to 
serve an originating process ex juris without leave of the court. In addition, the 
plaintiff could apply to the court for leave to serve ex juris in any other case.6 This 
basis for taking jurisdiction is called “assumed jurisdiction.”7
Originally, the grounds for service ex juris set the boundaries of a court’s 
assumed jurisdiction: It was as broad or as narrow as its rules permitting service 
abroad. But in 1990, Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye broke new ground in 
1. References to provinces include Canada’s three territories.
2. This article considers only the issue of taking jurisdiction (jurisdiction simpliciter) and not the 
issue of declining to exercise jurisdiction (such as under forum non conveniens).
3. For greater detail on this context and history, see Stephen GA Pitel & Nicholas S Rafferty, 
Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) ch 5.  
4. There was no debate about the court’s jurisdiction over the plaintiff: He or she submitted 
to the court’s jurisdiction by bringing the proceedings. Relatively recently, in the context 
of class actions, the issue has arisen about taking jurisdiction over members of the plaintiff 
class, especially if they are absent from the forum. See e.g. Das v George Weston Limited, 
2017 ONSC 4129, 283 ACWS (3d) 78; Airia Brands v Air Canada, 2017 ONCA 792, 284 
ACWS (3d) 260, rev’g 2015 ONSC 5332, 126 OR (3d) 756. This article does not address 
this particular issue. It focuses on jurisdiction over defendants.
5. (UK), 15 & 16 Vict, c 76.
6. See e.g. Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 17.03 [Ontario Rules].
7. See e.g. Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, 2015 SCC 42 at para 82, [2015] 3 SCR 69 [Chevron]. 
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holding that the rules for service ex juris do not by themselves confer jurisdiction 
on the courts.8 The Supreme Court of Canada held that there had to be “some 
limits to the exercise of jurisdiction against persons outside the province.”9 Those 
limits could not be found in the various provincial rules for service ex juris. For 
the Court, Justice La Forest indicated that the correct approach was to allow 
for proceedings when there was “a real and substantial connection with the 
action,” because that approach provided “a reasonable balance between the rights 
of the parties.”10
In 1994 the Uniform Law Conference of Canada proposed for adoption 
the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act.11 Its purposes, in part, were to 
establish a uniform set of standards for determining jurisdiction and to ensure 
that Canadian jurisdictional rules were consistent with the principles underlying 
Morguard. It has been implemented in Saskatchewan,12 British Columbia,13 and 
Nova Scotia.14 The law on taking jurisdiction in the other common law provinces 
and territories remains primarily based in the common law. Since the CJPTA 
was drafted with Morguard firmly in mind, one might have thought that the 
law on assumed jurisdiction would be reasonably similar as between provinces 
with the CJPTA and provinces relying on the common law. However, different 
approaches emerged.
In 2002, in Muscutt v Courcelles,15 the Court of Appeal for Ontario engaged 
in a thorough analysis of the real and substantial connection principle. For the 
court, Justice Sharpe isolated eight factors that the courts should consider in 
determining whether the principle had been satisfied. He said that no single 
8. [1990] 3 SCR 1077, 52 BCLR (2d) 160 [Morguard cited to SCR].
9. Ibid at 1104.
10. Ibid at 1108.
11. Uniform Law Conference of Canada, Proceedings of the Seventy-Sixth Annual Meeting, 1994, 
Appendix C: Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, online: <www.ulcc.ca/images/
stories/1994_EN_pdf/1994ulcc0008_Court_Jurisdiction_Proceedings_Transfer_Act.pdf> 
at 140 [CJPTA]. All references in this article to sections of the CJPTA are to this uniform 
statute. Unfortunately, in the various provinces the section numbers sometimes differ. For a 
comprehensive and detailed analysis of the statute, see Vaughan Black, Stephen GA Pitel & 
Michael Sobkin, Statutory Jurisdiction: An Analysis of the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings 
Transfer Act (Toronto: Carswell, 2012). 
12. The Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SS 1997, c C-41.1.
13. Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SBC 2003, c 28. For commentary, see 
Elizabeth Edinger, “New British Columbia Legislation: The Court Jurisdiction and 
Proceedings Transfer Act; the Enforcement of Canadian Judgments and Decrees Act” (2006) 
39:2 UBC L Rev 407.
14. Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, SNS 2003 (2nd Sess), c 2.
15. (2002), 60 OR (3d) 20, 213 DLR (4th) 577 [Muscutt]. 
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factor was determinative but that they all had to be weighed together.16 Under 
the Muscutt approach, it became common to refer to the “real and substantial 
connection test.” For over a decade, this approach was used inside and outside17 
Ontario as the test for assumed jurisdiction. The British Columbia courts, 
however, tended not to apply the eight Muscutt factors specifically, but to rely 
simply on the general proposition that there must be a real and substantial 
connection between the court and the defendant or between the court and the 
subject matter of the litigation.18 In addition, the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal, in Coutu v Gauthier (Estate),19 cast doubt on the need for courts to adopt 
the Muscutt test. Chief Justice Drapeau stressed the importance of distinguishing 
issues of jurisdiction simpliciter from issues of forum non conveniens and of not 
conflating the applicable tests. To his mind, most of the eight Muscutt factors 
were directed towards the ascertainment of the convenient forum. He thought 
that the essence of the real and substantial connection test was captured by the 
first Muscutt factor: The connection between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim.20
For its approach, the CJPTA drew directly on the Morguard principle in its 
provisions on territorial competence. It provides in section 3(e) for territorial 
competence in situations in which “there is a real and substantial connection 
between [enacting province or territory] and the facts on which the proceeding 
against that person is based.”21 Section 10 of the CJPTA goes on to develop the 
concept of real and substantial connection by providing a list of connections that 
are presumed, subject to being rebutted, to satisfy the test. The list is explicitly 
open-ended: The plaintiff remains free to establish other circumstances that 
constitute a real and substantial connection between the forum and the facts on 
which a proceeding is based.  
Because it is open-ended, the CJPTA approach requires that the court have a 
means to analyze whether there is a real and substantial connection to the forum in 
cases falling outside the presumptions. In Penny (Litigation Guardian of ) v Bouch, 
16. Ibid at paras 76-112. 
17. See e.g. Royal and Sun Alliance Insurance Co of Canada v Wainoco Oil & Gas Co, 2004 ABQB 
643, 364 AR 151, aff’d 2005 ABCA 198, 367 AR 177; Penny (Litigation Guardian of ) v 
Bouch, 2009 NSCA 80, 281 NSR (2d) 238 [Penny].
18. See e.g. UniNet Technologies Inc v Communication Services Inc, 2005 BCCA 114, 
38 BCLR (4th) 366.
19. 2006 NBCA 16, 296 NBR (2d) 34. 
20. Ibid at paras 56, 67. See also Fewer v Sayisi Dene Education Authority, 2011 NLCA 17, 305 
Nfld & PEIR 39.
21. CJPTA, supra note 11 at 144 [emphasis in original].
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the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal applied the eight factors from Muscutt.22 Justice 
Saunders stressed that fairness to both parties was important at the jurisdiction 
simpliciter stage as well as at the forum non conveniens stage. In stark contrast to 
the approach in Nova Scotia, the British Columbia Court of Appeal indicated 
that “any reliance on the Muscutt factors as a guide to determining the question 
of jurisdiction came to an end in British Columbia with the coming into force of 
the CJPTA.”23 The statute itself does not mandate this conclusion, since it leaves 
open the means of analysis to be used in cases not fitting one of the presumptions. 
But this conclusion is consistent with the general hostility, mentioned above, 
of the British Columbia courts to the Muscutt approach.
In 2012 the Supreme Court of Canada further developed the law on assumed 
jurisdiction in Club Resorts Ltd v Van Breda.24 The most important development 
was the Court’s conclusion that the real and substantial connection test should 
no longer be used directly as a rule governing the taking of jurisdiction.25 It held 
that it was a constitutional principle which operates at a higher level of generality. 
Instead, the real and substantial connection required for assumed jurisdiction had 
to be found in each case through a “presumptive connecting factor,” a factor that 
triggers a presumption of such a connection.26 When a presumptive connecting 
factor is established, the defendant can rebut the presumption.27
The Court stated that it would not set out a definitive list of presumptive 
connecting factors. The claims before the Court were in tort, and so the Court 
identified four presumptive connecting factors for tort claims: that the defendant 
is domiciled or resident in the forum, that the defendant carries on business 
in the forum, that the tort was committed in the forum, and that a contract 
connected with the dispute was made in the forum.28 The Court acknowledged 
that additional presumptive connecting factors would need to be identified by 
lower courts. It held that “[i]n identifying new presumptive factors, a court 
should look to connections that give rise to a relationship with the forum that is 
similar in nature to the ones which result from the listed factors.”29  
The most significant change from the Muscutt approach was that the Court 
held that where no presumptive connecting factor is established, a court cannot 
22. Penny, supra note 17.
23. Stanway v Wyeth Canada Inc, 2009 BCCA 592 at para 73, 314 DLR (4th) 618.
24. 2012 SCC 17, [2012] 1 SCR 572 [Club Resorts].
25. Ibid at paras 30, 70. 
26. Ibid at paras 75, 78, 100.
27. Ibid at paras 81, 95, 100.
28. Ibid at paras 68, 80, 90.
29. Ibid at para 91.
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take jurisdiction.30 It is not open to the plaintiff to establish jurisdiction by 
identifying factual connections that, while not amounting to a presumptive 
connecting factor, collectively warrant the court hearing the dispute. 
As the law is now, the important differences between the common law 
approach and the CJPTA approach to jurisdiction are as follows.
1. The common law retains jurisdiction based on the defendant’s 
presence in the province at the time he or she was served with 
process. The CJPTA abolishes presence-based jurisdiction and 
instead uses the defendant’s ordinary residence in the province as a 
basis for jurisdiction.
2. At common law, an aggregation of factual connections, none of 
which amount to a presumptive connecting factor, cannot be a 
basis for assumed jurisdiction. The position under the CJPTA 
is less certain.
3. All of the presumptions listed in section 10 of the CJPTA are 
bases for assumed jurisdiction in CJPTA provinces. However, 
some of these presumptions may not be recognized as presumptive 
connecting factors at common law.
4. The common law might recognize presumptive connecting 
factors that were deliberately excluded from the list of section 10 
CJPTA presumptions.
5. At common law, the court has no jurisdiction to determine title 
to, or the right to possession of, immovable property outside the 
province. This is likely also the case under the CJPTA, but there 
is some ambiguity on the matter because of the statute’s wording. 
30. Ibid at paras 81, 93.
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II. PRESENCE VERSUS ORDINARY RESIDENCE
At common law, the central basis for jurisdiction in personam has been territorial 
power. If the plaintiff serves the defendant with process—the document 
commencing the proceedings—while the defendant is present in the forum, 
then the local courts have jurisdiction to hear an action in personam against 
that defendant. The presence need not have any particular duration: Purely 
transitory presence is sufficient.31 The only limitation is in situations in which 
the defendant’s presence in the forum is involuntary because of duress or fraud.32
The merits of grounding jurisdiction on presence have been questioned, 
especially because of the possibility that the presence might be fleeting and 
thus the connection with the jurisdiction might be weak. Presence, however, 
is a long-standing basis for taking jurisdiction and, having been recently confirmed 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron Corp v Yaiguaje, it does not appear 
that common law courts are likely to reconsider this basis for jurisdiction in 
the near future.33 
It is relatively easy to determine whether an individual is present in the 
jurisdiction. Corporations and partnerships are more complex and, as a result, 
the common law has developed tests for determining the presence of these 
legal entities.34 
In contrast, presence is not a basis for jurisdiction under the CJPTA. Rather, 
the CJPTA provides, in section 3(d), for jurisdiction when the defendant is 
“ordinarily resident” in the forum at the time of the commencement of the 
proceedings.35 This is a more stringent requirement than presence. There is a 
growing jurisprudence on the meaning of ordinary residence.36 In one of the 
leading cases, Thomson v Minister of National Revenue, Justice Rand stated that 
“[i]t is held to mean residence in the course of the customary mode of life of 
the person concerned, and it is contrasted with special or occasional or casual 
31. For the famous English case on this point, see Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein, [1972] 2 
QB 283, [1972] 2 WLR 1077 (CA). 
32. See Lewis v Wiley (1923), 53 OLR 608 (SC), [1923] OJ No 170 (QL).
33. Chevron, supra note 7 at para 83.  
34. See Pitel & Rafferty, supra note 3 at 62-66.
35. CJPTA, supra note 11 at 144. Under this provision, the defendant could be served inside or 
outside the forum. 
36. See Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 11 at 75-76. See also Pitel & Rafferty, supra 
note 3 at 23-25.
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residence.”37 It is not necessary that an individual intend to make his or her home 
indefinitely in the jurisdiction, and an individual is not prohibited from having 
more than one ordinary residence, assuming a sufficient degree of settled purpose 
is evident in both places.38 Under this definition, the question arises as to what 
constitutes a settled purpose or a customary mode of life. The purpose need 
not involve staying forever: Much shorter periods, even with a definitive end in 
sight, can qualify as a settled purpose.39 A comprehensive analysis considers the 
residence of family members, location of furniture, ownership of property, and 
other relevant aspects of an individual’s life.  
The CJPTA contains specific provisions addressing the ordinary residence 
of corporations and partnerships.40 Section 7 provides that a corporation is 
ordinarily resident in the province only if:
(a) the corporation has or is required by law to have a registered office in [the 
province],
(b) pursuant to law, it (i) has registered an address in [the province] at which process 
may be served generally, or (ii) has nominated an agent in [the province] upon 
whom process may be served generally,
(c) it has a place of business in [the province], or
(d) its central management is exercised in [the province].41
Section 8 states that a partnership is ordinarily resident in the province only 
if (a) the partnership has, or is required by law to have, a registered office or 
business address in [the province], (b) it has a place of business in [the province], 
or (c) its central management is exercised in [the province].42
The two approaches differ not only in the degree of connection to the forum 
they require, but also in the way they consider the relevant time of assessment. 
The common law looks at presence at the time of the service of process on the 
defendant. In contrast, the CJPTA looks at ordinary residence at the time of 
37. [1946] SCR 209 at 224, [1946] 1 DLR 689 [Thomson]. See also Quigley v Willmore, 2008 
NSCA 33, 264 NSR (2d) 293; Armoyan v Armoyan, 2013 NSCA 99 at para 214, 334 NSR 
(2d) 204; Nafie v Badawy, 2015 ABCA 36, 381 DLR (4th) 208.
38. Thomson, supra note 37 at 224. See also Knowles v Lindstrom, 2014 ONCA 116 at para 32, 
118 OR (3d) 763.
39. Al Habtoor v Fotheringham, [2001] EWCA Civ 186 at paras 23-24, [2001] 1 FLR 951; 
Re R (Abduction: Habitual Residence), [2003] EWHC 1968 (Fam), [2004] 1 FLR 216.
40. For detailed analysis, see Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 11 at 76-88.
41. CJPTA, supra note 11 at 147. 
42. Ibid at 148. The CJPTA also addresses the ordinary residence of unincorporated associations 
in section 9. See ibid at 148.
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the commencement of proceedings. While the CJPTA does not define what it 
means to commence proceedings, the procedural rules in the relevant provinces 
generally provide that proceedings are commenced by the issuing of process by 
the court. This typically occurs somewhat earlier than service on the defendant.
As noted above, in Club Resorts, the Court held that the defendant’s residence 
in the province is a presumptive connecting factor in a tort claim. In subsequent 
decisions, this connection and others that the court set out for tort claims 
have been used beyond the tort context, such that they have become general 
presumptive connecting factors for all types of claims.43 So the common law, 
like the CJPTA, includes jurisdiction based on the defendant’s ordinary residence 
in the province.44 The key difference is that the CJPTA rejects the defendant’s 
presence as a basis for jurisdiction.
It is not surprising that the CJPTA does not use presence as a basis for 
jurisdiction. The modern trend is away from presence and toward concepts 
such as residence, and codifications prepared either for a single country or on a 
multilateral basis tend not to include it as a basis for jurisdiction.45 It is therefore 
hard to fault the CJPTA’s choice on this issue. However, a strong case can be made 
for retaining presence as a basis for jurisdiction at common law.46 The highest 
courts in Canada and the United States continue to support it.47 It flows from 
territorial sovereignty, such that those present in a jurisdiction owe allegiance to 
the institutions, including the courts, of that place. It accords with reasonable 
expectations, in that a defendant would reasonably expect to be sued and be 
able to defend where he or she is present. It promotes certainty, providing a 
court with a relatively clear and rigid rule about jurisdiction. And the doctrine’s 
harshest consequences, seen usually in cases of purely transitory presence, can 
43. See e.g. Sears Canada Inc v C & S Interior Designs Ltd, 2012 ABQB 573, 543 AR 191; Avanti 
Management & Consulting Ltd v Argex Mining Inc, 2012 ONSC 4395, 219 ACWS (3d) 
555; Royal Bank of Canada v DCM Erectors Inc, 2013 ONSC 2864, 228 ACWS (3d) 687; 
Sullivan v Four Seasons Hotels Ltd, 2013 ONSC 4622, 116 OR (3d) 365. 
44. There is a subtle difference, which is that under the common law there is the possibility that 
this presumptive connecting factor could be rebutted. Under the CJPTA, this is not possible.
45. See e.g. EC, Commission Regulation (EC) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), [2012] 
OJ, L 351/1 online: <eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:351:0001:
0032:En:PDF>. This is known as the “Recast Brussels I Regulation.”
46. See Stephen GA Pitel & Cheryl D Dusten, “Lost in Transition: Answering the Questions 
Raised by the Supreme Court of Canada’s New Approach to Jurisdiction” (2006) 85:1 Can 
Bar Rev 61 at 68-70.
47. Chevron, supra note 7 at para 83; Burnham v Superior Court of California, 495 
US 604 (1990). 
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be ameliorated through the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Accordingly, the 
elimination of presence-based jurisdiction is not a particularly strong reason 
for adopting the CJPTA. Ultimately, there is merit to both approaches, but on 
balance the Supreme Court of Canada should be commended for retaining 
presence as a basis for jurisdiction.
III. THE PRESUMPTIVE CONNECTING FACTORS
A. THE REQUIREMENT
As noted above, under the approach in Club Resorts, courts cannot take 
jurisdiction, apart from doing so based on presence and consent, unless there is 
a presumptive connecting factor connecting the dispute with the forum.48 This 
is a departure from the approach in Muscutt, under which a real and substantial 
connection could be established without reliance on a specific connecting factor. 
In contrast, and as also noted in Part I, above, the list in CJPTA section 10 
of presumed real and substantial connections is a subsidiary aspect of the more 
general basis of jurisdiction set out in section 3(e). That means, at least on the 
wording of the statute, a court could take jurisdiction under section 3(e) even in 
the absence of a presumption. Prior to Club Resorts, the courts did precisely this 
in several cases.49
A critical question posed by Club Resorts is whether its approach to jurisdiction 
will influence the interpretation given to section 3(e). It could lead courts to hold 
that section 3(e) requires, if not one of the presumptions in section 10, a similar 
presumption recognized by the court, such that in the absence of either it could 
not take jurisdiction. This would make the approach under the CJPTA the same 
as that under the common law. In Aleong v Aleong the British Columbia Supreme 
Court examined this specific issue.50 It held that: 
The idea of the court having a wide-ranging ability to establish other circumstances 
is very close to the “on-the-fly,” case-by-case exercise of discretion rejected by Mr. 
Justice LeBel in Van Breda. It is not supported by Mr. Justice LeBel’s discussion of 
the real and substantial connection test, or his discussion concerning identification 
of acceptable new presumptive connecting factors.51 
48. An odd exception is in a claim to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. In such a claim, 
such a connection is, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, not required. See Chevron, 
supra note 7 at para 3.
49. See Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 11 at 134-35.
50. 2013 BCSC 1428, 55 BCLR (5th) 364.
51. Ibid at para 105.
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It held that a presumptive connecting factor had to be established and that 
“a court should not assume jurisdiction on the basis of the combined effect of a 
number of non-presumptive connecting factors.”52 While some other cases have 
appeared to maintain a broader approach to section 3(e),53 they have done so 
without specifically considering whether Club Resorts has narrowed its scope and 
so are less valuable as authority.
It is regrettable that Club Resorts imposed the requirement of a presumptive 
connecting factor for assumed jurisdiction. The Muscutt approach was flexible but 
its open-endedness did not lead to errors in individual cases. Sections 3(e) and 10 
the CJPTA have preserved that flexibility. Insisting on a presumptive connecting 
factor—at common law and perhaps even under the CJPTA—now means that 
courts will have to identify such factors for a wide range of causes of action 
like unjust enrichment and breach of equitable duties. Courts will also have to 
struggle to apply presumptive connecting factors, such as the place of the tort 
being in the province, for torts such as conspiracy, negligent misrepresentation, 
and conversion. It is arguable whether the central goal of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, which was to attain a measure of certainty and predictability in the law 
on assumed jurisdiction, will end up being achieved.54
B. THE FACTORS
The common law and the CJPTA both rely on presumptive connecting factors. 
A central comparative issue is whether the lists of such factors will be identical in 
the two contexts and, if not, what the differences will be. It is easiest to start with 
the factors listed in section 10 of the CJPTA. It would seem sensible to think that 
all of them would be accepted by common law courts as presumptive connecting 
factors. For example, section 10(e)(i) creates a presumption for a proceeding 
concerning contractual obligations when those obligations were, to a substantial 
extent, to be performed in the province. Section 10(e)(iii) creates a presumption 
for a proceeding concerning contractual obligations when the contract resulted 
from a solicitation of business in the province by the seller of property or services 
for use other than in the purchaser’s business.55 Both these presumptions are 
52. Ibid at para 129. See also Li v MacNutt & Dumont, 2015 NSSC 53 at paras 35-36, 356 
NSR (2d) 176; DropLo Management Group Ltd v Howard, 2015 BCSC 1102 at paras 50-55, 
135 CPR (4th) 233.
53. See e.g. Kilderry Holdings Ltd v Canpower International BV, 2013 BCCA 82, 360 DLR (4th) 
500; Original Cakerie Ltd v Renaud, 2013 BCSC 755, 229 ACWS (3d) 400.
54. See Stephen GA Pitel, “Checking in to Club Resorts: How Courts Are Applying the New 
Test for Jurisdiction” (2013) 42:1&2 Adv Q 190 at 214.
55. CJPTA, supra note 11 at 149-50.
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not among the traditional grounds used by provinces to allow service ex juris in 
contract claims. But it would seem likely that common law courts will accept 
these as presumptive connecting factors, in large part because the CJPTA does.
One CJPTA presumptive connecting factor has been rejected by the 
common law approach, although for somewhat unusual reasons. Section 10(k) 
provides that in a proceeding to enforce a foreign judgment, a real and substantial 
connection to the forum is presumed to exist, though like all presumptions it 
can be rebutted. But, in Chevron, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded 
that because the analysis of a claim brought to recognize and enforce a foreign 
judgment considers the sufficiency of the rendering court’s jurisdiction, that 
is the only required analysis of jurisdiction and there is no need for separate 
consideration of the enforcing court’s jurisdiction. The Court stated:
In an action to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment where the foreign court 
validly assumed jurisdiction, there is no need to prove that a real and substantial 
connection exists between the enforcing forum and either the judgment debtor or 
the dispute. It makes little sense to compel such a connection when, owing to the 
nature of the action itself, it will frequently be lacking. Nor is it necessary, in order 
for the action to proceed, that the foreign debtor contemporaneously possess assets 
in the enforcing forum. Jurisdiction to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment 
within Ontario exists by virtue of the debtor being served on the basis of the 
outstanding debt resulting from the judgment.56
This is not the place to debate the wisdom of this view of the law,57 though it 
can perhaps be briefly noted that the Court’s view that the basis for jurisdiction 
is found wholly in the defendant being served with process runs contrary to the 
Court’s foundational decision in Morguard, which separated the issue of service 
of process from the issue of jurisdiction. The point here is simply the divergence 
between the common law and CJPTA approaches.
A more difficult issue is the extent to which the common law will develop 
presumptive connecting factors not found in the CJPTA and the extent to which 
courts in CJPTA provinces will then adopt those new factors under section 3(e). 
For example, in some provinces, the fact that the action is in respect of a contract 
made in the province is a ground for service ex juris.58  However, the view that 
this particular connection is not sufficiently strong led to it being omitted from 
the CJPTA.59 At common law, several cases have treated it as a presumptive 
56. Chevron, supra note 7 at para 3. See also Solecki v Stroud Resources Ltd, 2017 BCSC 1130 at 
para 31, 281 ACWS (3d) 64.
57. See Pitel & Rafferty, supra note 3 at 165-66.
58. See e.g. Ontario Rules, supra note 6, r 17.02(f )(i).
59. Except in Saskatchewan. See Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 11 at 35-36, 104.
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connecting factor despite this lack of strength.60 In Club Resorts, the Supreme 
Court of Canada suggested in passing that this is a presumptive connecting 
factor.61 So there are two issues: whether the place of contract formation will 
survive sustained scrutiny as a presumptive connecting factor at common law, 
and, if so, whether the courts of CJPTA provinces will use that factor under 
section 3(e) despite its considered omission from section 10. It is possible, and 
perhaps likely, that the two approaches may come to different answers in respect 
of this factor.
Controversially, in Club Resorts, the Supreme Court of Canada held, with 
only minimal analysis, that in a tort claim a contract connected to the dispute 
and made in the province constitutes a presumptive connecting factor.62 Such a 
presumption is not included in the CJPTA or in any province’s list of enumerated 
grounds for service ex juris. The presumption raises several issues. First, as just 
noted, the place of making a contract is arguably not a strong connection to a 
particular forum. It seems even weaker in the context of a tort claim. Even if a 
connected contract matters in analyzing the tort claim, the focus on its place of 
formation, as opposed to its place of performance, may be misplaced. Second, 
courts now are faced with the difficult issue of determining when a contract is 
sufficiently “connected” to a tort claim.63
The Supreme Court of Canada affirmed this factor in Lapointe Rosenstein 
Marchand Melançon LLP v Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP.64 In this case, the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice had been critical of the lack of clarity provided 
by the Supreme Court of Canada, noting that the Court “did not really explain 
how it came up with this … presumptive connecting factor.”65 It suggested a 
narrow interpretation: That the factor should be understood to mean that 
60. See e.g. Edward Jones v Raymond James Ltd, 2013 ONSC 4640 at paras 5-6, 229 ACWS (3d) 
708; Tyoga Investments Ltd v Service Alimentaire Desco Inc, 2015 ONSC 3810, 255 ACWS 
(3d) 326, aff’d 2016 ONCA 15, 262 ACWS (3d) 350.
61. Club Resorts, supra note 24 at para 88.
62. Ibid at paras 88, 90.
63. This issue could arise frequently in respect of insurance contracts. See e.g. Forsythe v 
Westfall, 2015 ONCA 810, 128 OR (3d) 124; Tamminga v Tamminga, 2014 ONCA 
478, 120 OR (3d) 671. In these decisions, the court held the insurance policies were not 
connected contracts.
64. 2016 SCC 30, [2016] 1 SCR 851, aff’g Trillium Motor World Ltd v General Motors of 
Canada Ltd, 2014 ONCA 497, 120 OR (3d) 598, aff’g 2013 ONSC 2289, 51 CPC (7th) 
419 [Lapointe Rosenstein]. See also Parque Industrial Avante Monterrey, SA de CV v 1147048 
Ontario Ltd, 2016 ONSC 6004 at paras 27-35, 134 OR (3d) 71; Toews v Grand Palladium 
Vallarta Resort & Spa, 2016 ABCA 408, 408 DLR (4th) 282.
65. Lapointe Rosenstein ONSC, supra note 64 at para 5. 
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an Ontario court has jurisdiction over a tort claim brought by a non-party to an 
Ontario contract that is connected with the dispute, if the non-party can be brought 
within the scope of the contractual relationship by the terms of the contract, and if 
the events that gave rise to the claim flowed from the relationship created by that 
contract.66 
The Court of Appeal for Ontario did not comment on this interpretation, 
but agreed with the motion judge that the presumptive connecting factor was 
established on the facts.67 A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
this factor “requires that a defendant’s conduct brings him or her within the scope 
of the contractual relationship and that the events that give rise to the claim flow 
from the relationship created by the contract.”68 In dissent, Justice Côté held 
that the defendants had not been brought within the scope of the contractual 
relationship and that, as such, the majority’s approach amounted to allowing 
any contract connected to the tort claim to satisfy this factor.69 While the debate 
about the interpretation of this factor is likely to continue, its existence as a factor 
in the common law analysis is clear. It is unclear whether the courts of CJPTA 
provinces will agree.
IV. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
The general common law rule, invariably sourced to the decision of the House of 
Lords in British South Africa Co v Companhia de Moçambique,70 is that a Canadian 
court has no jurisdiction to determine title to, or the right to possession of, 
immovable property situated outside the forum. The rationale underlying the rule 
is that a court should not grant a judgment which it has no power to enforce and 
which may bring the court into conflict with the authority of a foreign sovereign 
or the jurisdiction of a foreign court.71 It is also clear that a foreign court includes 
one in another part of Canada and that foreign immovable property therefore 
66. Ibid at para 12.
67. Lapointe Rosenstein ONCA, supra note 64 at paras 39-72.
68. Lapointe Rosenstein SCC, supra note 64 at para 44. 
69. Ibid at paras 82-87. 
70. [1893] AC 602, [1891-94] All ER Rep 640 (HL). See also Tezcan v Tezcan (1987), 20 BCLR 
(2d) 253 at para 14, 46 DLR (4th) 176 (CA); Lucasfilm Ltd v Ainsworth, [2011] UKSC 39 
at para 55, [2012] 1 AC 208. For a recent application, see Moradkhan v Mofidi, 2013 BCCA 
132 at para 52, 43 BCLR (5th) 116.
71. Duke v Andler, [1932] SCR 734 at 739, [1932] 4 DLR 529.
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includes land in another part of Canada. The rule raises important issues as to its 
scope and also has some exceptions.72
In setting out rules for the taking of jurisdiction, the CJPTA does not 
mention the foreign immovable property rule.73 While the matter is not entirely 
free from doubt, the common law rule likely continues to operate alongside the 
statutory scheme on the basis that the rule is one of subject matter jurisdiction 
rather than territorial jurisdiction and so is unaffected by the statute.74 It would, 
however, be better for the CJPTA to have expressly addressed this important 
dimension of jurisdiction and so avoided ambiguity.
V. CONCLUSION
In Club Resorts, in making significant changes to the common law on jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court of Canada noted that all of its comments “about the 
development of the common law principles of the law of conflicts are subject to 
provisions of specific statutes and rules of procedure.”75 This appears to accept 
that there is room for some difference in approach between the common law 
and the CJPTA. Nevertheless, the decision brought the common law much more 
in line with the CJPTA approach than it had previously been, certainly as far as 
Ontario is concerned.  
In 2009, the Law Commission of Ontario issued a consultation paper 
examining the exercise of jurisdiction by Ontario courts in civil cases.76 Written 
by Janet Walker, a leading Canadian private international law scholar, with input 
from a working group of other scholars in the field,77 the paper called for the 
implementation of a jurisdiction statute in Ontario, though not necessarily in the 
same terms as the CJPTA.78 The project did not move beyond the consultation 
stage. In part, it was interrupted by the Club Resorts litigation. In the consultation 
paper, a range of reasons were advanced for adopting a statute. Some were based 
72. See Pitel & Rafferty, supra note 3 at 332-40.
73. Indeed, the CJPTA does not contain any provision that expressly states when the court does 
not have jurisdiction, as opposed to stating when it does.
74. For discussion, see Black, Pitel & Sobkin, supra note 11 at 46-48.
75. Club Resorts, supra note 24 at para 68.
76. The paper was only available on the Law Commission’s web site but it is no longer there. 
However, for a detailed discussion of the paper, see Vaughan Black & Stephen GA Pitel, 
“Proposed Reform of Ontario’s Law on Jurisdiction” (2009) 47:3 Can Bus LJ 469.
77. I was a member of the working group.
78. Black & Pitel, supra note 76 at 470. 
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on the notion that the common law was in need of reform.79 The strength of 
those reasons may have been reduced by the changes which have since taken 
place to the common law on jurisdiction. If the common law is, in essence, quite 
similar to the CJPTA, reform along the lines of that statute is unnecessary.  
However, there were other reasons for a jurisdiction statute, at least one 
of which remains equally important today. The law of civil jurisdiction is an 
important aspect of any legal system.  It is somewhat anomalous for the law on 
such a topic to be found mainly in the decided cases. A statutory codification 
would make the law more accessible and more knowable, not just to lawyers 
but to the general public.80 Indeed, it is arguable that one of the most important 
differences between the common law approach and the CJPTA approach involves 
not the content, but rather the means by which the content is expressed.
Accordingly, it would be a welcome development for those provinces which 
have not done so to implement a statute on jurisdiction. That statute should be 
along the general lines of the CJPTA, in part because there is value in some broad 
measure of consistency. But each such statute need not be identical. Variations in 
possible bases for jurisdiction are acceptable.81 Indeed, such variations are expressly 
contemplated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Club Resorts.82 In addition, 
it is time to consider whether some amendments to the CJPTA as enacted in 
British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Saskatchewan are desirable. Legal principles 
about jurisdiction have evolved and globalization has increased incrementally 
since the CJPTA was drafted. The courts can only shift their interpretations of the 
various provisions for so long. Meaningful revisions are then required. 
79. Ibid at 472. 
80. Ibid at 475.
81. Ibid at 475-76.
82. Club Resorts, supra note 24. The Court observes that: 
The development of an appropriate framework for the assumption of jurisdiction requires a 
clear understanding of the general objectives of private international law. But the existence 
of these objectives does not mean that the framework for achieving them must be uniform 
across Canada. Because the provinces have been assigned constitutional jurisdiction over such 
matters, they are free to develop different solutions and approaches, provided that they abide 
by the territorial limits of the authority of their legislatures and their courts (ibid at para 71). 
 Also, in the context of an interprovincial jurisdiction dispute, “[c]onflict rules vary from one 
jurisdiction to another.” See Lapointe Rosenstein SCC, supra note 64 at para 33.
